I am a senior researcher at the Institute for Science and Ethics at the University of Bonn. I am also an associate professor of philosophy at Spring Hill College.
I have published peer-refereed articles in philosophy of education, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science (biology and physics), epistemology, metaethics, social-and-political philosophy, and other areas of philosophy. But currently, most of my research is about artificial intelligence, especially AI ethics and AI in academia.
I have taught many university-level courses as sole instructor, especially in areas of applied ethics.
Please contact me if you want to read any of my work.
Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder, 2009
B.A., Philosophy, University of Washington, Seattle, 2004
Seniors Researcher, Institute for Science and Ethics, University of Bonn, 2024–present
Associate Professor, Philosophy, Spring Hill College, 2021–present
Assistant Professor, Philosophy, Spring Hill College, 2016–2021
Metcalf, T. (forthcoming, 2027). Five advantages of AI-delivered education in sustainable development cooperation. In W. Leal Filho, L. V. Trevisa, & A. L. Salvia (Eds.), Using Artificial Intelligence to Tackle Sustainable Development and Climate Change Challenges (forthcoming). Springer Nature. https://link.springer.com/book/9783032340399
Metcalf, T. (2026a). AI-produced humanities research: On the dangers of technical incrementalism. Philosophy & Technology, 39, 69. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-026-01085-6
Metcalf, T. (2026b). Debord, spectacle, and technical incrementalism in the humanities. Philosophy & Technology, 39, 131. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-026-01146-w
Metcalf, T. (2026c). Explaining the wrongs of undisclosed LLM use: Reply to Sahebi and Montefiore. Philosophy & Technology, 39, 113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-026-01129-x
Metcalf, T. (2026d). Is AI-produced humanities scholarship a case of research misconduct? Journal of Academic Ethics, 24, 70. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10805-026-09745-0
Metcalf, T. (2026e). On a misleading ethical fluency in language models: Reply to Danagher. Philosophy & Technology, 39, 188. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-026-01201-6
Metcalf, T. (2025). AI safety and regulatory capture. AI & Society, 41, 2451–2466. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-025-02534-0
Metcalf, T., & Haramia, C. (2025). Is life observable? In R. Playfair (Ed.), Exophilosophy: The philosophical implications of alien life (pp. 13–33). Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003440130-3/life-observable-thomas-metcalf-chelsea-haramia
Metcalf, T. (2022). The case for philosophy as a general-education requirement. Teaching Philosophy, 45(3), 299–326. https://doi.org/10.5840/teachphil2022414163
Hildebrand, T., & Metcalf, T. (2022). The nomological argument for the existence of God. Noûs, 56(2), 443–472. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12364
Metcalf, T. (2022). Against indifference objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument. Southwest Philosophy Review, 38(1), 199–208. https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202238121
Metcalf, T. (2021). On Friederich’s new fine-tuning argument. Foundations of Physics, 51, 31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-021-00449-6
Metcalf, T. (2020). An axiological-trajectory theodicy. Sophia, 59(3), 577–592. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-00747-7
Metcalf, T. (2018). Gun violence as industrial pollution. Public Affairs Quarterly, 32(2), 159–183. https://doi.org/10.2307/26909989
Metcalf, T. (2018). Fine-tuning the multiverse. Faith and Philosophy, 35(1), 3–32. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20181992
Metcalf, T. (2018). An epistemic-virtue solution to some peer disagreements in philosophy. Southwest Philosophy Review, 34(1), 103–116. https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201834111
Metcalf, T. (2017). On Gödel’s ontological argument. Inference, 3(2), https://inference-review.com/letter/on-goedels-ontological-argument
Metcalf, T. (2016). Ontological parsimony, erosion, and conservatism. Metaphilosophy, 47(4–5), 700–718. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12210
Metcalf, T. (2013). The Under-Determination Objection to deductive bare-difference arguments. Southwest Philosophy Review, 29(1), 107–118. https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201329112
Metcalf, T. (2006). Entailment and ontological arguments: Reply to Maydole. Philo, 8(2), 131–133. https://doi.org/10.5840/philo2005826
Metcalf, T. (2006). An argument from non-gratuitous evil. In M. Martin & R. Monnier (Eds.), The Improbability of God (pp. 420–432). Prometheus.
Metcalf, T. (2004). Omniscience and maximal power. Religious Studies, 40(3), 289–306. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412504007061
“The Ethics of AI Robots,“ “Intelligente Roboter als KI-Systeme: Deutschlands Zukunft!,“ Munich Circle, Garcher, November 2026.
“Sustainable AI, Five Years Later: An Opinionated History,” WisPerMed Summer School, Leuven, September 2026.
“Ethics of AI in Sport, Health, and Nutrition Science,” University of Cologne, July 2026.
“Sustainable AI, Five Years Later: An Opinionated Summary,” University of Heidelberg, July 2026.
“AI Use in Research,” Early-Career Researcher Series, University of Bonn, February 2026.
“AI in Academic Publishing,” panel discussion, ALPSP Berlin Seminar, January 2026.
“AI in Journalism Education,” Deutsche Welle Akademie, Bonn, December 2025.
Panel discussion, “Cross-Cultural Approaches to Desirable AI,” Center for Science and Thought, Bonn, November 2025.
“Ethics and Limitations of AI in Graduate School,” University of Hawaii Mānoa, October 2025.
“Shaping Sustainable AI and its Futures,” University of Bonn, September 2025.
“AI-Assisted Research in the Humanities,” Bonn Sustainable AI Conference, September 2025.
Panel discussion, “Sustainable AI,” GAIA Conference, University of Bonn, September 2025.
“The Bonn Sustainable AI Lab,” Lamarr Scientific Forum, September 2025.
Panel discussion, Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum, July 2025.
Panel discussion, “Sustainable Futures? Analyzing AI's Contributions to Ecology and Education,” Dresden, Germany, February 2025.
Symposium presentation, “Life@Lab 2 – Horizons of AI Research in Higher Education,” Dresden, Germany, February 2025.
Panel discussion, “Sustainable AI in Social Context,” Center for Science and Thought, Bonn, Germany, December 2024.
“Emotional-Conformity Machines: Large Language Models and the Suppression of ‘Outlaw Emotions,’” Irrationality and the Age of AI Conference, May 2026.
“Five Advantages of AI-Delivered Education as Sustainable Development Cooperation,” European Seminar on AI for Sustainability and Climate Change, January 2026.
“Toward sustainable AI-assisted research: A policy model for humanities departments, labs, and policy institutes.” Shaping Sustainable AI and its Futures, September 2025.
“AI-Enhanced ErUM: Four New Epistemic and Ethical Considerations,” Shaping the Digital Future of ErUM Research: Sustainability & Ethics, July 2025.
“AI-Assisted Research in the Humanities: Am I the Author? Does it Matter?” Society for the Philosophy of Technology, June 2025.
“Underestimating the Problem of Evil,” Main-Program Colloquium, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, February 2023.
“Basic Income, Armchair Essentialism, and the Moral Value of Work,” Main-Program Colloquium, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, February 2022.
“Fine-tuning, the Multiverse, and the Total Evidence Requirement,” Main-Program Colloquium, American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, January 2022.
“Against Indifference Objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument,” Southwestern Philosophical Society Conference, October 2021.
“Diachronic Fine-Tuning and Statistical Independence,” Main-Program Colloquium, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, March 2021.
“The Divine Inscrutability Objection to the Fine-Tuning Argument,” Main-Program Colloquium, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, February 2020.
“The Axiological-Trajectory Theodicy,” Main-Program Colloquium, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, February 2019.
“Do Educators Build Human Capital? Responding to the ‘Mere Signaling’ Critique of Higher Education,” University of South Alabama Conference on Teaching and Learning, May 2018.
“Why Anselmian Theists Should Reject Modal S5,” Alabama Philosophical Society, September 2018.
“Do Educators Build Human Capital? Responding to the ‘Mere Signaling’ Critique of Higher Education,” University of South Alabama Conference on Teaching and Learning, May 2018.
“An Epistemic-Virtue Solution to Some Peer-Disagreements in Philosophy,” Southwestern Philosophical Society Conference, November 2017.
“Rags-to-Riches Worlds: A New Theodicy and Argument for Theism,” Alabama Philosophical Society, September 2017.
“Epistemic Responsibility and the Moral-Realist Majority,” Philosophers’ Cocoon Conference, October 2016.
“Gun Violence as a Negative Externality of Gun Production,” Alabama Philosophical Society, September 2016.
“Nachhaltiger Einsatz von KI in Planungsbüros,“ interview, Competitiononline, October 2026.
“Question the Question,” interview, Deutsche Welle, September 2026.
“AI Paranoia in Academia,” interview, Nature, September 2026.
“The Soul,” interview, Radio Bremen, August 2026.
“"How green is AI – resource consumption?”, interview, Radio Cologne, November 2025.